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To make nothing but positive decisions, or nothing but negative 
decisions, all he needs is uncertainty – which, in a refugee hear-
ing, is not hard to come by. (p. 41) 
In a period when forced migration rates are unparalleled, Cameron’s book is a timely account of how “the hole” in refugee law’s foundation may destabilize refugee protec-
tion endeavours across the world. Refugee Law’s Fact-Finding 
Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake is less focused on 
individual decision-makers themselves (i.e., Immigration 
and Refugee Board members and federal court judges), and 
more on the law that governs their decision-making. The 
book proposes a model to prevent decision-makers from 
making the worst mistake—denying a genuine refugee rec-
ognition. This innovative approach, which is based on risk 
assessments that resolve doubt in the claimant’s favour, will 
lend itself useful to any refugee determination system.
The Wrong Mistake: The Role of Error Preference in 
the Law
In refugee determination hearings, Cameron asks, which 
mistake is the worst to make? Is it the one that will cause the 
most harm, or the one that the institution of law prefers? In 
Part 1, Cameron sets the context for her study by analyzing 
the role of refugee law’s fact-finding structures (i.e., stand-
ard of proof, burden of proof, evidentiary burden, and legal 
burden). She specifically demonstrates how these fact-find-
ing structures allow decision-makers to shift their doubt into 
findings of fact. Cameron’s analysis of criminal and civil legal 
systems shows which types of error the law prefers. However, 
in Canada’s refugee law, the court (i.e., Federal Court of Can-
ada) fails to demonstrate a consistent preference, fluctuating 
between erring in the claimant’s favour or against. Such a 
discretionary stance allows decision-makers to come to ei-
ther a positive or negative decision when presented with the 
same evidence. Cameron employs a psychology-based the-
ory of risk premised on the conceptual themes of “salience” 
and “framing” (i.e., certain kinds of harm will resonate with 
some people more than others, since people tend to overem-
phasize different types of information in their minds) to in-
vestigate how decision-makers respond when presented with 
identical risks. As decision-makers fear certain harms more 
than others, salience and framing ultimately influence their 
error preference. Cameron explores how refugee law frames 
a problem, and, in turn, she presents why the law may prefer 
certain errors over others (i.e., denying a “genuine” refugee 
claimant recognition with a negative decision vs. recognizing 
a “fraudulent” refugee claimant with a positive decision). 
Refugee Law Through the Lens of Error Preference
Cameron analyzes the judgments of decision-makers who 
find themselves at either end of the spectrum in instances of 
great uncertainty—those who resolve doubt in the claimant’s 
favour and those who resolve doubt against the claimant, 
eschewing court judgments that fall on the middle ground. 
Cameron analyzes particular judgments that more clearly il-
lustrate the court’s perspective on error preference. If a judge 
can uphold only tribunal determinations that are deemed 
reasonable, and the court itself has two completely different 
perspectives on what reasonable fact-finding is, then the ref-
ugee determination system is “vulnerable to influence and 
abuse” (p. 41). Cameron analyses dozens of judgments where 
the court had found that the Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada had assessed evidence unfairly in denying a refu-
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gee claimant recognition. The court warned that genuine ref-
ugees may encounter dire circumstances when board mem-
bers make erroneous decisions, which may occur from their 
rigid application of procedures or the dismissal of claimants’ 
vulnerability. In one example, a board member chose to make 
a personal judgment of a claimant’s mental health, despite a 
psychiatric report that warned that formal questioning could 
trigger PTSD, and irrespective of the fact that the claimant 
needed to be taken to the hospital during the hearing as a re-
sult of breathing difficulties from crying (see Kuta v Canada, 
2009). Cameron also reviews instances where the court pre-
fers to resolve doubt in the claimant’s favour, demonstrating 
a concern for the potential harm a mistaken rejection may 
cause in instances of uncertainty. In these cases, the court 
reiterates that while the burden of proof rests predominantly 
with the claimant, the decision-maker must also share that 
burden. Here the court has a low threshold of risk, ultimate-
ly tasked with determining if a claimant faces “more than a 
mere possibility” (p. 87) of harm.
Cameron also documents judgments in which the court 
resolves uncertainty and doubt against the claimant, helping 
the board avoid the mistake of granting an unfounded claim. 
In these judgments, the court finds that refugee law is not 
different from other areas of law and demonstrates a prefer-
ence of resolving doubt against claimants, treating them like 
any other type of litigant. Cameron suggests that the court’s 
judgments here are guided by the comfort and the famili-
arity of traditional civil proceedings, where judgments that 
resolve doubt in the claimant’s favour are governed by risk 
assessments. Finally, Cameron analyzes the law’s fact-finding 
structure to help illustrate how Canada’s refugee law allows 
the board in instances of doubt to “reach whichever conclu-
sion they prefer for whatever reason they want” (p. 160). 
A Way Forward: Resolving Doubt in the Claimant’s 
Favour
The most compelling part of Cameron’s work is her proposed 
solution. What should reasonable fact-finding look like when 
the court is of two minds on the matter? Cameron draws 
from British and Australian judgments (see Karanakaran v 
Secretary of the Home Department, 2000) to develop what 
she terms the Karanakaran approach. This method would re-
quire that decision-makers undertake a risk assessment by 
using abductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive or in-
ductive reasoning), which in instances of great uncertainty 
could pass as one of the most effective ways to assess risk. 
With abductive reasoning, decision-makers are required to 
identify and contemplate counter-theories of explanations. 
The Karanakaran approach further requires decision-makers 
to carry all their doubts into the final stages of decision-mak-
ing (as opposed to dropping them earlier on), enabling a 
rather global assessment of evidence. This approach would 
also require decision-makers to resolve doubt in the claim-
ant’s favour, as denying a genuine convention refugee recog-
nition would be the more harmful mistake to make.
Cameron’s book is impressive in its own right in the sheer 
quantity of court judgments that were reviewed, but also in 
her ability to explain administrative law concepts clearly to 
readers from non-legal backgrounds. While Cameron pro-
vides detailed and concrete legal solutions for legal scholars 
and administrative stakeholders alike, this work does not 
engage with the critical socio-legal theories of discretion. 
Considering that discretion is such a large theme woven 
throughout her text, it would have been helpful, from a 
socio-legal perspective, to engage with a broader theoretical 
analysis of discretion that goes beyond a simplistic law-dis-
cretion binary. Nonetheless, Cameron’s research would 
make a great companion to coursework on topics of forced 
migration, as it is highly relevant to cross-disciplinary 
scholars interested in refugee determination systems in the 
Global North. 
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